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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. (“Allied”) appeals the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s declaratory judgment in favor of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 542 (“Union”), holding 
that their collective bargaining agreements were indefinite, contrary to the aims of federal 
labor law, and terminable by either party with reasonable notice. Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs, Local Union No. 542 v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., No. 12-6579, 2013 
WL 1234729, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2013). For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the decision of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 Writing solely for the parties, we briefly review the essential facts. In 1992, the 
parties entered into two collective bargaining agreements pertaining to work dismantling 
a closed steel plant in Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania.
1
 The agreements established wages, 
working conditions, and other terms.
2
 The Fairless Hills project continues to date, and the 
Union anticipates it to continue at least another five years. (Compl. ¶ 13.) 
                                              
1
 Each agreement covers a separate bargaining unit. The “Operator Agreement” covers 
equipment operators and utility personnel. The “Helper Agreement” covers helpers. The 
relevant provisions are identical.  
2
 The agreements provided no method to renegotiate these terms. However, in 2004, 
Allied agreed to wage and benefit increases. Allied also recently agreed to increase 
contributions to the employees’ healthcare plan. The record is unclear when this 
occurred, but the precise date does not affect our decision. (Appellant Br. at 4 (most 
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 The agreements define the Fairless Hills project as “[Allied’s] jobsite at the USX 
Corporation Fairless Hills Pennsylvania facility at which [Allied] performs dismantling 
work on decommissioned property pursuant to a contract with USX Corporation (herein 
referred to as the ‘Project’).” (Joint Appendix “JA” at 63, 83.) USX decides what is to be 
dismantled by Allied at the Fairless Hills project. Article I, Section 4 of the agreements 
states that “[i]n the event [Allied] is successful in procuring dismantling work at jobsites 
other than the Project within the Union’s geographical jurisdiction, [Allied], in its 
complete discretion, may elect to extend this Agreement to such other jobsites on a 
jobsite-by-jobsite basis.” (Id. (emphasis added).) The termination provision of each 
agreement provides that  
this Agreement shall terminate upon [Allied’s] completion of the Project. 
As to any jobsite to which this Agreement is extended on a jobsite-by-
jobsite basis[,] . . . the Agreement and [Allied’s] recognition of the Union 
for employees employed at such jobsite shall terminate upon the 
completion of [Allied’s] work at such jobsites.  
 
(Id. at 78, 97.) The agreements also contain a severability clause
3
: “Any provision of this 
Agreement which now or subsequently is found . . . to contravene [the] law . . ., shall be 
suspended in operation . . . . Such suspension shall not affect the operation or validity of 
the remainder of the provisions of this Agreement.” (Id. at 77, 96.)  
 In August, 2011, the Union notified Allied that it intended to terminate the 
agreements and requested negotiations for successor agreements. Allied filed a complaint 
                                                                                                                                                  
recent modification occurred in 2009)); (Appellee Br. at 5 (2010)); (Compl. ¶ 11 (2008)); 
(Answer & Countercl. ¶ 12 (2009)). 
3
 The severability clause is Article XXI of the Operator Agreement and Article XX of the 
Helper Agreement. 
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with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), alleging that such notice violated the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The NLRB Regional Director dismissed the 
charge and Allied appealed. The NLRB held Allied’s appeal in abeyance during the 
pendency of the proceedings below. The NLRB Office of Appeals then terminated its 
consideration of Allied’s appeal following the issuance of the District Court’s opinion. 
 The Union requested the District Court to declare the agreements terminable upon 
reasonable notice, which the Union claimed it provided.
4
 (See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.) Allied 
argued that the termination provisions were valid and sought a declaration that the 
agreements remained in effect until completion of the Fairless Hills project. (See Answer 
¶ 3.) The District Court held that the agreements were of “indeterminate duration” and 
were “inconsistent with the aims of federal labor law.” Allied Erecting & Dismantling 
Co., 2013 WL 1234729, at *3. Therefore, the parties could terminate them upon 
reasonable notice. Id. at *4. Allied appealed. 
II.
5
 DISCUSSION 
 “[F]ederal law governs the construction of collective bargaining agreements, [and] 
traditional rules of contract interpretation apply when not inconsistent with federal labor 
law.” Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls–Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 
                                              
4
 In the alternative, the Union claimed that the agreements were invalid due to unilateral 
mistake, mutual mistake, and because they failed to reflect the true intention of the 
parties. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30, 33.) 
5
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. UAW, 856 F.2d 
579, 587 (3d Cir. 1988). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. We exercise 
plenary review over conclusions of law when reviewing a decision to grant a declaratory 
judgment. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 174 n.17 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “If less than all of an agreement is 
unenforceable [as against public policy], a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the 
agreement in favor of a party who did not engage in serious misconduct if the 
performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential part of the 
agreed exchange.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184(1) (1981); see also Puleo v. 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 186 (3d Cir. 2010). A severability analysis requires 
that we determine whether a contract provision is unenforceable, and, if so, whether it 
may be severed from the remainder of the agreement. See Puleo, 605 F.3d at 186. 
 A.  Article I, Section 4 is unenforceable. 
 Labor contracts of indefinite duration contravene federal labor policy and are 
terminable at will. E.g., Montgomery Mailers’ Union No. 127 v. Advertiser Co., 827 F.2d 
709, 715 (11th Cir. 1987). However, a contract may terminate upon a specified event 
rather than a predetermined date. E.g., UAW v. Randall Div. of Textron, Inc., 5 F.3d 224, 
229 (7th Cir. 1993).  
 The District Court concluded that the agreements were of indefinite duration and 
terminable by both parties with reasonable notice. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 
2013 WL 1234729, at *3. It concurred with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Montgomery Mailers’ Union, 827 F.2d at 715–16. The contract therein “continue[d] in 
effect for such reasonable time . . . as may be required for negotiation of a new 
agreement.” Id. at 715. The union argued that under this provision, the agreement 
terminated only upon successful negotiation of a new agreement. Id.  
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 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the union, which was disinclined to enter into a 
new agreement, “could perpetuate the existing contract by continuing negotiations but 
never reaching an agreement.” Id. “The side not desiring a change could refuse to agree . 
. . . Each side could stand entrenched knowing the contract would continue as it was. The 
side desiring to alter the terms or conditions of the relationship would never have a prayer 
of success.” Id. (quoting Kaufman & Broad Home Sys. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Firemen, 
607 F.2d 1104, 1110 (5th Cir. 1979)). This was “contrary to fundamental principles of 
law, our established national labor relations policy and the intent of Congress expressed 
in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.” Id.  
  The District Court found that the instant agreements reached the same untenable 
result. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 2013 WL 1234729, at *3. It reasoned that, as 
in Montgomery Mailers’ Union, one party (Allied) could extend the agreements 
indeterminately. Id. It enumerated three examples: Allied could stall the Fairless Hills 
project, contract for additional work on that project, or “in its complete discretion, 
contract for additional work on other projects, extend the agreements to that additional 
work, and subsequently bind the Union to the agreements for an unknown and 
perpetually endless time period.” Id. This would freeze wages and benefits indefinitely 
and prevent workers from negotiating pay raises or additional benefits. Id. The District 
Court concluded that the aims of federal labor law required allowing the parties to 
terminate such indefinite agreements. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151). Therefore, either party 
could terminate the agreements upon reasonable notice. Id. at *4. 
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 On appeal, Allied argues that the agreements are not indefinite because they 
terminate upon the occurrence of a specified event—the completion of the Fairless Hills 
project. See, e.g., Randall Div. of Textron, 5 F.3d at 229. Even if Allied extended the 
agreements to other projects, Allied claims those agreements would also terminate when 
the projects concluded. Furthermore, Allied argues that the District Court’s analogy to 
Montgomery Mailers’ Union is misplaced because that case narrowly applies only when 
post-expiration clauses extend an agreement indefinitely pending the negotiation of a new 
agreement.  
 Allied argues that, even if Montgomery Mailers’ Union applies, the District Court 
erred in concluding that Allied has unilateral control over the agreements’ termination. It 
notes that Allied’s client, and not it, controls the length of the project and that there is no 
allegation Allied is stalling. Next, it advances numerous reasons why its “complete 
discretion” over extending the agreement does not render it “indefinite.”  
 First, it argues that “each extension creates a new and separate project agreement,” 
which terminates upon completion of that particular project. (Appellant Br. at 14.) 
Second, because each extension creates a “new” agreement for a distinct bargaining unit, 
Allied claims that the Union completely controls whether it is bound because it can 
always “refus[e] the extension through a valid disclaimer of interest in representing such 
bargaining unit.” (Id.) Third, even if the District Court correctly uncovered the possibility 
of perpetual agreements, it failed to recognize that, as pertains to Fairless Hills, the 
agreements distinctly terminate when work is completed. (Id. at 14–15.) Thus “even 
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assuming that the agreements could ‘go on forever’ [by extension to other jobsites] it is 
impossible for either to go on forever at Fairless Hills.” (Id. at 15.) 
 We concur with the District Court that Allied’s complete discretion in Article I, 
Section 4 of the agreements over whether to extend these agreements to other jobsites 
renders the agreements indefinite. The agreements’ plain language rebuts Allied’s claim 
that each extension creates a “new and separate project agreement.” (Id. at 14.) Article I, 
Section 4 and the termination provision refer to the extension of “this Agreement.” (JA at 
63, 78, 83, 97 (emphasis added).) Article I, Section 4 merely grants Allied the power to 
“extend” the agreements; it does not create “new and separate” agreements. Cf. Nibbs v. 
Felix, 726 F.2d 102, 104–05 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that arbitration provisions were still 
binding after contract’s termination because they were informally extended).  Thus, the 
1992 agreements (including modifications), and no others, would apply to other jobsites.  
 Allied unpersuasively contends that the agreements are not indefinite because they 
terminate upon completion of the Fairless Hills project (and that extensions terminate 
upon completion of work at new jobsites). Article I, Section 4 allows Allied, in its sole 
discretion, to extend the agreements to new projects. Even worse, at each new jobsite, the 
governing agreements would still contain this extension clause, permitting Allied to 
unilaterally extend the agreements to still other projects, ad infinitum. This would be true 
long after work at Fairless Hills concludes. All the while, Allied need never update the 
employment terms.
6
 
                                              
6
 Allied’s brief does not contest the District Court’s conclusion that perpetuating the 
agreements indeterminately would “lock in the wages and benefits designated in the 
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 Thus, although the facts here are distinguishable from Montgomery Mailers’ 
Union, the rationale is consistent. The agreements are indefinite because one party 
unilaterally controls the termination event.
7
 Allied may, in its complete discretion, extend 
the agreements indefinitely into the future. “The side desiring to alter the terms or 
conditions of the relationship would never have a prayer of success.” Montgomery 
Mailers’ Union, 827 F.2d at 715 (quoting Kaufman & Broad Home Sys., 607 F.2d at 
1110).  
 The District Court also rested its conclusion on Allied’s hypothetical ability to 
“stall” the project indefinitely, thereby rendering the agreements potentially indefinite as 
applied to the Fairless Hills project.
 8
 Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 2013 WL 
                                                                                                                                                  
agreements indefinitely, depriving workers of the ability to negotiate pay raises or 
additional benefits.” Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 2013 WL 1234729, at *3. 
7
 Allied’s argument that the Union can refuse the extension by disclaiming interest in 
future bargaining units serves only to demonstrate how pervasive is Allied’s control over 
termination. This is even more extreme than Kaufman & Broad Home Systems in which 
the Court noted that “there is nothing in the agreement as interpreted by [the employer] 
that would keep it from continuing year after year, thus forcing the [u]nion to choose 
between termination of the entire agreement and [indefinite continuation].” 607 F.2d at 
1109.  
8
 The District Court also concluded that Allied could hypothetically render the 
agreements indefinite by contracting for additional work on the Fairless Hills Project. 
However, the Union concedes that one jobsite cannot contain an infinite amount of work. 
(See Brief of Appellee at 6 n.4 (“[T]he Fairless Hills dismantling projects could only 
necessarily involve a finite number of buildings.”).) Indeed, the Union believes the work 
at Fairless Hills could conclude in five years. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Obviously, under the terms 
of the agreements, the work will terminate at some point in time. Additionally, the 
agreements limit the term “Project” to “[Allied’s] jobsite at the USX Corporation Fairless 
Hills Pennsylvania facility at which [Allied] performs dismantling work on 
decommissioned property pursuant to a contract with USX Corporation.” (JA at 63, 82–
83). Nothing in the agreements or the record purports to permit Allied to “contract[] for 
additional work” beyond this bargained-for scope. See Allied Erecting & Dismantling 
Co., 2013 WL 1234729, at *3.  
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1234729, at *3. We find the trajectory of this argument troubling and reject it. We note 
especially that the District Court only found that Allied “could” extend the project by 
stalling, not that it ever had done so. Id. To begin with, it is difficult to understand how 
Allied “could” unilaterally stall the project since the dismantling is being done pursuant 
to a contract with a third party, USX. Furthermore, it is obvious that such a theoretical 
analysis, taken to its extreme, could render indeterminate all contracts that terminate upon 
completion of a project rather than a pre-determined date because one party could always 
hypothetically stall. We do not say that in an appropriate case a district court may never 
consider stalling—hypothetical or otherwise—as a factor; however, we reject the District 
Court’s approach, in which hypothetical stalling is a sufficient cause of indefiniteness. 
We also reject any notion that contracts which terminate upon completion of work at a 
particular jobsite are per se indeterminate.  
 We are required to construe labor contracts in light of the “practice, usage and 
custom pertaining to all such agreements.” Transp.–Commc’n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 161 (1966). Additionally, we must recognize the “‘dual purpose’ in 
the Taft–Hartley Act—to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to 
protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their own benefit.” 
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 289 (1957) (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 
350 U.S. 270, 284 (1956)). In light of these considerations, we hold that permitting 
Article I, Section 4 to extend the agreements indefinitely into the future “would be 
inconsistent with the aims of federal labor law.” Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 2013 
WL 1234729, at *3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (finding that “protection by law of the right 
11 
 
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce” and declaring a 
policy of “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining”)).  
 B.  Article 1, Section 4 is severable. 
 This does not end the analysis, however. The agreements contain a severability 
clause which suspends the operation of any provision found “to contravene a national, 
state, or local law.” (JA at 77, 96.) If such suspension occurs, the operation or validity of 
the remainder of the agreements’ provisions is to remain unaffected. (Id.)  
 “[T]raditional rules of contract interpretation apply when not inconsistent with 
federal labor law.” Rolls–Royce, 989 F.2d at 135. “If less than all of an agreement is 
unenforceable [as against public policy], a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the 
agreement . . . if the performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an 
essential part of the agreed exchange.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184(1); see 
also Puleo, 605 F.3d at 186. Whether performance is essential turns on its “relative 
importance in the light of the entire agreement between the parties.” Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 184, cmt. a; see also Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 
206 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 In supplemental briefing and at oral argument in open court both parties conceded 
that, if Article I, Section 4 is found to be unenforceable, the severability clause suspends 
its operation. Furthermore, the parties also agree, and we find, that Article I, Section 4 is 
not an essential part of the agreed exchange. The primary purpose of the agreements at 
issue is to establish wages, benefits, working conditions, and dispute resolution 
procedures for the covered bargaining units at Allied’s Fairless Hills project. (See JA at 
12 
 
62, 82.) This goal can be accomplished without the extension provision, which pertains to 
other jobsites. Cf. Prusky v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 695, 699–700 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that nonessential and illegal late-trading provisions in life insurance contract 
were severable). 
 To the extent that Article I, Section 4 and the portions of those Sections which 
reference it permit the agreements to be extended indefinitely into the future, these 
provisions should be deemed unenforceable and severed pursuant to the severability 
clause. What remains of the agreements is not indefinite because it terminates upon the 
occurrence of a specified event—completion of the Fairless Hills project. See, e.g., 
Randall Div. of Textron, 5 F.3d at 229. This outcome is consistent with federal labor 
policy and our jurisprudence. The federal labor policy promoting labor relations stability 
does not permit parties to unilaterally repudiate collective bargaining agreements during 
the agreed-to term. See Int’l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 
Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 778 (3d Cir. 1988) [Deklewa].
9
  While protecting 
                                              
9
 The Union attempts to distinguish Deklewa as applying only to § 8(f) agreements; 
however, Deklewa suggests a broader application for its principle. See, e.g., 843 F.2d at 
773, 778 (resolving in the affirmative “whether during its term a § 8(f) agreement is as 
binding and enforceable as any other union agreement” and noting the NLRB’s rationale 
that “a right of unilateral repudiation is . . . antithetical to traditional principles of 
collective-bargaining under the [NLRA]” (emphasis added)); see also Builders, 
Woodworkers & Millwrights, Local Union No. 1 (Glen Falls Contractors Ass’n), 341 
N.L.R.B. 448, at *1 n.2 (2004) (“Regardless of whether this may have been a 9(a) or 8(f) 
relationship, the . . . employers were not free to unilaterally repudiate their agreement 
with the Carpenters and recognize the Respondent.”); John Deklewa & Sons, 282 
N.L.R.B. 1375, 1386 (1987) (“Our new analytic framework also better fulfills general 
statutory policies and integrates Section 8(f) with other sections in the Act. In this regard, 
the policy of labor relations stability in the Act generally favors requiring parties to 
adhere to a voluntarily adopted collective-bargaining agreement.”). 
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collective bargaining is also an overarching objective of the NLRA, we have recognized 
that this goal is strengthened by requiring adherence to the terms of labor contracts. See, 
e.g., Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 755 F.2d 330, 335 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Integrity of the 
collective bargaining process under the [NLRA] is critical to the stability of labor 
relations. The ability of duly elected bargaining representatives to bargain effectively is 
dependent in part upon its ability to bind the employees it represents to the terms of a 
negotiated agreement.”).  
 The District Court’s opinion did not address the Union’s remaining claims: 
unilateral mistake, mutual mistake, and reformation based on party intent. (See Compl. ¶¶ 
26, 30, 33.) We decline Allied’s invitation to decide these issues on appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s declaratory 
judgment in favor of the Union and remand the case to that Court to determine the 
Union’s remaining claims in a manner consistent with this Opinion. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the extension provision of Article I, 
Section 4 of the agreements is unenforceable.  I part company with the majority, 
however, with respect to the holding that the collective bargaining agreements are not of 
indeterminate duration because they will terminate upon completion of the Fairless Hills 
project, a project that has spanned more than three decades since the agreements were 
negotiated.  Indeed, there is no end in sight for the project, and I believe that is the 
quintessential example of an indeterminate duration.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s conclusion that the collective bargaining agreements at issue are not 
terminable at will by either party upon reasonable notice.  
 As the majority notes, “[f]ederal law governs the construction of collective 
bargaining agreements, [and] traditional rules of contract interpretation apply when not 
inconsistent with federal labor law.”  Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls–
Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).  In interpreting labor 
contracts, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to “fashion from the policy of 
our national labor laws” a body of substantive federal law.  Textile Workers Union of 
America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).   
 Employing this authority, federal courts have articulated the principle that “[l]abor 
contracts of indeterminate duration are generally terminable at will upon reasonable 
notice to the other party.”  Communications Workers of America v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 713 F.2d 1118, 1123 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1983); Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 
174 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Montgomery Mailers’ Union No. 127 v. Advertiser 
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Co., 827 F.2d 709, 715 (11th Cir. 1987).  This is because our labor laws encourage 
collective bargaining between labor organizations and employers as a means of both 
ensuring “the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to 
wages, hours, or other working conditions,” as well as safeguarding the “equality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees.”  29 U.S.C. § 151.  In the absence 
of a periodic opportunity to adjust wages, hours, or working conditions, an indefinite 
labor agreement becomes a tool that exacerbates the inequality of bargaining power 
between employers and laborers, rather than providing a bulwark against it.   
 The majority acknowledges that the agreements as written cannot stand, as they 
purport to give Allied the unilateral ability to extend the agreements indefinitely to any 
new jobsites they desire.  Rather than taking the remedial step of declaring the 
agreements terminable at will by either party, the majority seeks to reform the indefinite 
contracts to limit them to a definite duration.  To do this, the majority strikes Article I, 
Section 4. but leaves in place the provision indicating the agreements will terminate upon 
the completion of “[Allied’s] jobsite at the USX Corporation Fairless Hills Pennsylvania 
facility.”  (App. 78) 
 The majority believes this fix renders the agreements definite and enforceable, 
noting that the “Union concedes that one jobsite cannot contain an infinite amount of 
work.”  Maj. Op. at 9, fn. 8 (emphasis added).  But indeterminate does not mean infinite.  
Indeterminate is defined as “uncertain; not ascertained; not fixed; not made certain.”  
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 610 (3rd ed. 1969).  For instance, an agreement that 
provided that it would terminate upon a certain person’s death would be indeterminate 
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because, although a human lifespan is not infinite, its duration is not capable of being 
ascertained in advance by the parties to the contract.   
 Although I agree that this case does differ from Montgomery Mailers Union, upon 
which the District Court relied, in that neither party to the contracts possesses the 
unilateral ability to extend the collective bargaining agreements in perpetuity, this case 
similarly presents contracts whose duration cannot be fixed or ascertained by the parties 
in advance of termination.  The majority comforts itself that “the work at Fairless Hills 
could conclude in five years” (Maj. Op. at 9, fn. 8), but when pressed at oral argument, 
Allied’s counsel conceded that he had “no idea how long it could take” for the Fairless 
Hills project to be completed.  (Oral Arg. At 31:46-31:50).  Uncertainty about the amount 
of time the contracts will govern the relationship between the parties prevents the 
members of the union from knowing how long they will have to continue to labor under 
the existing contractual terms—negotiated more than twenty years ago—before being 
permitted to renegotiate.  The duration of the agreements is, therefore, “uncertain; not 
ascertained; not fixed; not made certain.”  Ballentine’s Law Dictionary at 610.   
The majority’s conclusion that the agreements are not indeterminate because the 
projects will be completed at some unknown time in the distant future thwarts federal 
labor law’s preference for the negotiated adjustment of “industrial disputes arising out of 
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions.”  29 U.S.C. § 151.  In this 
instance, it is the laborers whose terms and conditions of employment are frozen 
indefinitely.  In another instance, it may be the employer who becomes hostage to a 
collective bargaining agreement of indefinite duration, negotiated perhaps at a time when 
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organized labor had the upper hand in bargaining.  The point is that neither labor nor the 
employer should be unable to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment on a 
periodic basis.  The majority’s holding effectively forecloses the union from doing so on 
behalf of its members for however long it may take to complete the Fairless Hills project.  
 The majority notes that “federal labor policy promoting labor relations stability 
does not permit parties to unilaterally repudiate collective bargaining agreements during 
the agreed-to term.”  Maj. Op. at 9 (citing Int’l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 778 (3d Cir. 1988) 
[Deklewa]).  But Deklewa concerned a very different factual scenario—an employer’s 
attempt to renege on a collective bargaining agreement with a fixed three-year term.  Id. 
at 772.  I would not extend Deklewa to the type of agreements at issue here, which have 
no ascertainable duration.  In such cases, federal labor law’s interest in stability is 
outweighed by its concern with equalizing bargaining power between labor organizations 
and employers and preventing the ossification of disputed wages, hours, and working 
conditions.  See 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
  Because I believe considerations of federal labor policy weigh in favor of 
allowing the parties to terminate the agreements at issue upon giving reasonable notice, I 
respectfully dissent.   
